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Abstract
We consider data poisoning attacks, where an adversary can modify a small fraction of
training data, with the goal of forcing the trained classifier to have low accuracy. While a body
of prior work has developed many attacks and defenses, there is not much general understanding
on when various attacks and defenses are effective. In this work, we undertake a rigorous
study of defenses against data poisoning in online learning. First, we theoretically analyze four
standard defenses and show conditions under which they are effective. Second, motivated by
our analysis, we introduce powerful attacks against data-dependent defenses when the adversary
can attack the dataset used to initialize them. Finally, we carry out an experimental study
which confirms our theoretical findings, shows that the Slab defense is relatively robust, and
demonstrates that defenses of moderate strength result in the highest classification accuracy
overall.
1 Introduction
Machine learning is increasingly used in safety-critical applications, and hence designing machine
learning algorithms in the presence of an adversary has been a topic of active research [2, 3, 4, 5,
11, 12, 13]. A style of adversary that is commonly studied is data poisoning attacks [4, 12, 15, 21]
where the adversary can modify or corrupt a small fraction of training examples with the goal of
forcing the trained classifier to have low classification accuracy. Such attacks have threatened many
real-world applications including spam filters [23], malware detection [25], sentiment analysis [24]
and collaborative filtering [15].
There has been a body of prior work on data poisoning with increasingly sophisticated attacks
and defenses [4, 12, 15, 21, 22, 27, 29, 30]. However, the literature largely suffers from two main
limitations. First, most work is on the batch setting – all data is provided in advance and the
adversary assumes that the learner’s goal is to produce an empirical minimizer of a loss. This
excludes many modern machine learning algorithms, such as, stochastic gradient descent, or learning
from a data stream. The second drawback is that there is little analysis, and hence not much
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rigorous understanding of exactly how powerful the attacks are, and the conditions under which
defenses are successful.
In this work, we address both limitations by providing a rigorous analysis of data poisoning for
online learning against four popular defenses. In online learning, examples arrive sequentially, and
at iteration t, the learner updates its parameters based on the newly-arrived example. We select
as our learner perhaps the most basic yet widely-used algorithm – online gradient descent (OGD).
Starting with an initial parameter value and a loss function, OGD updates its parameter value by
taking a small step against the gradient of the loss at the current example. For data-poisoning, we
assume the semi-online setting [32] – the adversary’s goal is to attack the classifier produced at
the end of online learning. Additionally, the learner has a defense in place that filters out input
examples with certain properties that are determined by the precise defense.
To analyze the defenses, we consider three regimes of effectiveness. In the first easy regime,
there exists a simplistic attack that can break the defense rapidly. In the second hard regime,
there are no successful data poisoning attacks that succeed against a defense. In between lies an
intermediate regime where effective attacks exist, but are not as simplistic or powerful. Specifically,
our contributions are as follows:
• We prove that the popular L2-norm defense, which filters out all examples outside an L2-ball
is always in the easy regime and is hence mostly weak.
• We characterize conditions under which the labeling oracle defense [29, 31], where the adversary
only provides an unlabeled example to be labeled by an annotator, is in the easy regime or in
the hard regime.
• We next analyze two data-dependent defenses – the L2-distance-to-centroid defense and the slab
defense [12, 30] – that are initialized based on clean data, and provide performance guarantees.
• Motivated by our analysis, we introduce a novel attack on the data-dependent defenses when
the adversary is capable of corrupting a small fraction of the data used for initializing them.
Is our analysis confirmed by practice? And how do data poisoning defenses impact overall classifica-
tion accuracy – given that they also act on clean examples? We next investigate these questions
through an experimental study where we test classification accuracy under the L2-norm defense, the
L2-distance-to-centroid defense and the slab defense for a variety of defense strengths and against a
number of baseline attacks.
Our experiments corroborate that the L2-norm defense is mostly weak; in contrast, the L2-distance-
to-centroid defense has three regimes of effectiveness, and the slab defense has either three regimes of
effectiveness or is robust depending on the dataset. We also find that our data-dependent attacks are
highly effective against the L2-distance-to-centroid defense, and moderate to highly effective against
the slab defense for some datasets. This indicates that the slab defense may be a highly effective
defense overall for online learning. Finally, we find that in most cases, classification accuracy is the
highest when the defense strength is moderate – which ensures that not too many clean examples
are filtered out by the defenses. This indicates that defense parameters need to be chosen suitably
in real applications while taking classification accuracy into account.
2
Related Work. The work closest in spirit to ours is [12], which proposes and analyzes strong
data poisoning attacks that break a number of data sanitization based defenses. Their work however
differs from ours in two major ways. First, they are in the offline setting where all data is provided
in advance and the learner is an offline empirical risk minimizer; second, their analysis focusses
on the number of distinct poisoning examples needed while ours characterizes when defenses are
effective against attacks. [19, 20] provides upper bounds on the number of poisoning points required
to poison online and offline learners; however, they do not consider specific defenses, and their results
only hold for certain classes of distributions. [10] provides a convex optimization algorithm that is
resistant to data poisoning attacks and has provable guarantees; however, their algorithm is also in
the offline setting and requires advance knowledge of the data.
Data poisoning is a threat to a number of applications [15, 23, 24, 25], and hence there is extensive
prior work on it – mostly, in the offline setting. Efficient attacks have been developed against
logistic regression, SVM and neural networks [4, 12, 21, 22, 29], and defenses have been in analyzed
in [15, 30].
Recent work has looked at data poisoning in the online setting against classification [14, 32, 34],
contextual bandits [17] and autoregressive models [1]. Prior works on online attacks include [32],
which finds an efficient gradient-ascent attack method for a number online objectives, and [14], which
views the attack process as an optimal control problem to be solved by a nonlinear optimization solver
or be approximated using reinforcement learning [34]. However, little is understood on the defense
side, and our work is the first to provide theoretical performance guarantees of attacks and defenses
for online data poisoning. Finally, there has also been prior work on outlier detection [7, 8, 9]; unlike
ours, these are largely in the unsupervised learning setting.
2 The Setting
We consider online learning – examples (xt, yt) arrive sequentially, and the learner uses (xt, yt) to
update its current model θt, and releases the final model θT at the conclusion of learning. Our
learner of choice is the popular online gradient descent (OGD) algorithm. The OGD algorithm,
parameterized by a learning rate η, takes as input an initializer θ0, and a sequence of examples
S = {(x0, y0), . . . , (xT−1, yT−1)}; at iteration t, it performs the update:
θt+1 = θt − η∇`(θt, xt, yt)
where ` is an underlying loss function – such as square loss or logistic loss. We focus on logistic
regression classifiers in this work, which uses logistic loss.
Attacker and Defense Model. We consider attackers that can add at most K examples to the
data stream in any position. The attacker’s goal is to modify the final model θT output by the
learner so that it satisfies certain objectives. For example, θT could be equal to a specific θ∗, or
have high error on the data distribution.
We assume that the attacker works against a learner equipped with a defense mechanism that is
characterized by a feasible set F . If the incoming example (xt, yt) ∈ F , then it is used for updating
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θt; otherwise it is filtered out. For example, in the popular L2-norm defense, F is an L2-ball of radius
R; data-dependent defenses such as the Slab and the L2-distance-to-centroid defense correspond to
more sophisticated feasible sets.
We may now formalize the attacker as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Data Poisoner). A Data Poisoner DP η(θ0, S,K,F , θ∗, ), parameterized by a
learning rate η, takes as input an initializer θ0, a sequence of examples S, an integer K, a feasible
set F ⊆ X × Y, a target model θ∗, and a tolerance parameter  and outputs a sequence of examples
S˜. The attack is said to succeed if S˜ has three properties – first, an OGD that uses the learning rate
η, initializer θ0 and input stream S˜ will output a model θ s.t. ‖θ∗ − θ‖ ≤ ; second, S˜ is obtained by
inserting at most K examples to S, and third, the inserted examples lie in the feasible set F .
For simplicity of presentation, we say that a data poisoner outputs a model θ if the OGD algorithm
obtains a model θ over the data stream S˜.
3 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of common defenses against data poisoning. In order to
test the strength of a defense, we propose a simple data poisoning algorithm – the SimplisticAttack.
A defense is weak if this attack succeeds for small K, and hence is able to achieve the poisoning
target rapidly. In contrast, a defense is strong if no attack can achieve the objective. We analyze
the conditions under which these two regimes hold for an online learner using logistic loss.
Algorithm 1 SimplisticAttack(θ0, S, K, F , θ∗, , R)
Let θ˜0 be the model learned over the clean stream S starting from θ0.
λ = ‖θ∗‖ , S˜ = S, t = 0, γ0 = min
(
R/‖θ˜0 − θ∗‖, 1/η
)
while t < K and ‖θ˜t − θ∗‖ ≥  do
γt = min (γ
∗
t , γ0), where γ∗t is the solution of γ to
γ
1+exp(θ˜>t (θ∗−θ˜t)γ)
= 1η
xt, yt = γt(θ
∗ − θ˜t),+1
if (xt, yt) ∈ F then append (xt, yt) to S˜
elif (−xt,−yt) ∈ F then append (−xt,−yt) to S˜
t = t+ 1
return S˜
The SimplisticAttack algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. Suppose the online learner has an
initial model θ0, and the poisoning target is θ∗. SimplisticAttack appends at most K poisoning
points to the clean stream S. Let θ˜0 denote the output of OGD on S. The poisoning points all lie
on the line θ∗ − θ˜0 with magnitude at most R. The algorithm is inspired by the iterative teaching
method in [16].
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3.1 Bounded L2 Norm Defense.
In many applications, the learner requires the input vector to be within a bounded domain, for
example having bounded Lp norm. We consider inputs with bounded L2 norm, which corresponds
to a defense mechanism with a feasible set F = {(x, y)| ‖x‖2 ≤ R} for some constant R. Notice that
if the input domain is bounded by L∞ or L1 norms, we can still find an L2 ball inscribed in the
domain. We next show that SimplisticAttack is a very efficient data poisoner for this setting.
Theorem 3.1. Let θ0 and θ∗ be the initial and the target model. Suppose the feasible set
F = {(x, y)| ‖x‖2 ≤ R} and ‖θ∗‖ = λ. If K > C log(λ/) for some constant C = C(R), then
SimplisticAttack(θ0, S,K,F , θ∗, , R) outputs a θ such that ‖θ − θ∗‖ ≤ .
Remark. Theorem 3.1 suggests that SimplisticAttack outputs a θ close to θ∗ within logarithmic
number of steps w.r.t. 1/. Therefore, the defense is in the easy regime if C is not too large. The
factor C increases with decreasing R, and is in the order of O(1/R) when R is small. However, in
real applications, the learner cannot set R to be arbitrarily small because this also rejects clean
points in the stream and slow down learning. We investigate this in more details in the experiment
section.
3.2 The Labeling Oracle Defense
In many applications, the adversary can add unlabeled examples to a dataset, which are subsequently
labeled by a human or an automated method. We call the induced labeling function a labeling
oracle. Denoting the labeling oracle by g, we observe that this oracle, along with bounded L2 norm
constraint on the examples, induces the following feasible set:
F = {(x, y)|‖x‖ ≤ R, y = g(x)}, (1)
For simplicity, we analyse the oracle defense on a different feasible set F ′ = {(yx,+1)|(x, y) ∈ F}
derived from F . We call F ′ the one-sided form of F because it flips all (x,−1) ∈ F into (−x,+1)
and as a result only contains points with label +1. Lemma A.1 shows that an attacker that outputs
θ using K points in F always corresponds to some attacker that outputs θ using K points in F ′
and vice versa. Therefore, the defenses characterized by F and F ′ have the same behavior.
We next show that for feasible sets F ′ of this nature, three things can happen as illustrated in
Figure 1. First, if F ′ contains a line segment connecting the origin O and some point in the direction
of θ∗ − θ˜0, then SimplisticAttack can output a θ close to θ∗ rapidly. Second, if F ′ is within a convex
region G that does not contain any point in the direction of θ∗ − θ0, then no poisoner can output
θ∗. Third, if F ′ contains points in the direction of θ∗ − θ˜0 but not the origin, then the attack
can vary from impossible to rapid. Theorem 3.2 captures the first and the second scenarios, and
Appendix A.4 shows various cases under the third.
Theorem 3.2. Let L(r,u) = {cu/ ‖u‖ |0 < c ≤ r} denote a line segment connecting the origin
and ru/‖u‖ for some vector u. Also, let θ0, θ∗ be as defined in Theorem 3.1 and θ˜0 be the online
learner’s model over the clean stream S. Suppose ‖θ∗‖ = λ.
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Figure. 1: Schematic illustration of the one-sided feasible sets F ′ corresponding to three defense
regimes. Left to right: defense in the easy, hard and intermediate regime.
1. If L(r, θ∗ − θ˜0) ⊆ F ′ for some r > 0 and K ≥ C log(λ/) for some constant C, then
SimplisticAttack(θ0, S,K,F ′, θ∗, , r) outputs a θ with ‖θ − θ∗‖ ≤ .
2. If there exists a convex set G such that 1) F ′ ∈ G, and 2) G⋂L(+∞, θ∗ − θ0) = ∅, then no
data poisoner can output θ∗ for any K.
Remarks. The second statement implies that if G⋂L(+∞, θ∗ − θt) = ∅ for θt at time t, then no
attack is possible from time t onwards.
3.3 Data-driven Defenses
A common data poisoning defense strategy is to find a subset of the training points that are
anomalous or ‘outliers’, and then sanitize the data set by filtering them out before training.
Following [6, 12, 26, 30], we assume a defender who builds the filtering rule using clean data that
the poisoner cannot corrupt. Thus the poisoner knows the defense mechanism and parameters, but
has no way of altering the defense. We focus on two defenses, the L2-distance-to-centroid defense
and the Slab defense [12, 30], which differ in their outlier detection rules.
Defense Description. Both defenses assign a score to an input example, and discard it if its score
is above some threshold τ . The L2 norm constraint on the input vector still applies, i.e. ‖x‖ ≤ R.
Let µ+ denote the centroid of the positive class and µ− the centroid of the negative class computed
from the clean initialization set.
L2-distance-to-centroid defense assigns to a point (x, y) a score ‖x− µy‖. This induces a feasible sets
Fc+ = {(x,+1)| ‖x− µ+‖ ≤ τ, ‖x‖ ≤ R} for points with label +1 and Fc− = {(x,−1)| ‖x− µ−‖ ≤
τ, ‖x‖ ≤ R} for points with label −1. The total feasible set Fc = Fc+
⋃Fc−.
Slab defense assigns to a point (x, y) a score |(µ+−µ−)>(x−µy)|. We call β = µ+−µ− the ‘defense
direction’. The defense induces a feasible set Fs+ = {(x,+1)||β>(x− µ+)| ≤ τ, ‖x‖ ≤ R} for points
with label +1 and Fs− = {(x,−1)||β>(x− µ−)| ≤ τ, ‖x‖ ≤ R} for points with label −1. The total
feasible set Fs = Fs+
⋃Fs−.
L2-distance-to-centroid Defense. First, if τ is large such that either Fc+ or Fc− contains the
origin, then SimplisticAttack can approach the target rapidly. Second, if τ is small such that the
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one-sided form of Fc does not contain any point on the positive side of the hyperplane with normal
vector (θ∗ − θ0), then no attack is possible. Lemma 3.3 shows the condition for these two cases.
Lemma 3.3. Let u+ be µ+’s projection on θ∗ − θ0. Similarly, let u− be µ−’s projection on θ0 − θ∗.
1. If τ > min(‖µ+‖ , ‖µ−‖) and K ≥ C log(λ/) for some constant C, then ∃r > 0 such that
SimplisticAttack(θ0, S,K,Fc, θ∗, , r) outputs a θ with ‖θ − θ∗‖ ≤ .
2. Otherwise, if 〈µ+, θ∗ − θ0〉 < 0, 〈µ−, θ0 − θ∗〉 < 0 and τ ≤ min(‖u+‖ , ‖u−‖), then no data
poisoner can output θ∗ for any K.
Slab Defense. Each of Fs+ and Fs− is a ‘disc’ between two hyperplanes with normal vector β.
When τ is large such that either Fs+ or Fs− contains the origin, SimplisticAttack can approach θ∗
rapidly. When τ is small and the projection of y(θ∗ − θ0) on β is in the opposite direction to that of
µy for y = +1 and −1, then no attack is possible. Lemma 3.4 characterizes the condition for both
cases.
Lemma 3.4. Let β = (µ+ − µ−), b+ = −β>µ+, b− = β>µ−. WLOG, assume β>(θ∗ − θ˜0) ≥ 0.1
1. If τ − b+ > 0 > −τ − b+ or τ − b− > 0 > −τ − b−, then there exist a data poisoner
DP η(θ0, S,K,Fs, θ∗, ) that outputs a θ with ‖θ − θ∗‖ ≤  for K ≥ C log(λ/) for some
constant C.
2. If 0 ≥ τ − b+ > −τ − b+ and 0 ≥ τ − b− > −τ − b−, then SimplisticAttack cannot output θ∗
for any K. In addition, if β>(θ∗ − θ0) ≥ 0, then no data poisoner outputs θ∗ for any K.
We examine the effectiveness of both data-driven defenses with various defense parameters τ in the
experiment section.
4 Attacking Data-driven Defenses
Analysis on data-driven defenses in Section 3 assumes that the attacker cannot influence the outlier
detector. However in practice, the initialization set used to generate the outlier score is rarely
absolutely clean, and hence the score is often based on a mixture of clean and poisoned data [12, 30].
Motivated by our analysis in Section 3, we propose two attacks on data-driven defenses. These
attacks inject m poisoning examples into the initialization set of size n so as to undermine defense.
Attack on L2-distance-to-centroid Defense. Lemma 3.3 shows that the defense breaks down if
the norm of the centroid is small compared to the defense parameter. This motivates us to move the
centroid closer to the origin. WLOG, we consider the centroid µ+ for points with +1 labels. The
attacker injects m copies of (x,+1), where x is found by solving the following optimization problem
min
x
‖nµ+ +mx‖ s.t. ‖x‖ ≤ R. (2)
1If β>(θ∗ − θ˜0) < 0, we can let β = (µ− − µ+). The Slab score remains the same.
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Attack on Slab Defense. Lemma 3.4 shows that the defense breaks down if τ is large compared
to −yβ>µy where β = µ+ − µ−. This motivates us to reduce the latter by altering the defense
direction. In specific, the attacker can maximize the angular difference, or equivalently minimize the
cosine value between the defense directions before and after contaminating the data set. Let n+ and
n− denote the number of points with +1 and −1 label in the initialization set. The attacker injects
m+ copies of (x+,+1) and m− copies of (x−,−1) obtained from solving the following problem
min
x+,x−
cos(β, µ′+ − µ′−)
s.t. µ′+ =
n+µ+ +m+x+
n+ +m+
, µ′− =
n−µ− +m−x−
n− +m−
,
m+ +m− = m, ‖x+‖ , ‖x−‖ ≤ R.
(3)
We examine the effectiveness of these attacks in Section 5.
5 Experiments
Is our analysis confirmed by practice? And how do data poisoning defenses impact overall classifica-
tion accuracy – given that they also act on clean examples? We now investigate these questions
through an experimental study. In particular, we ask the following questions.
• Do practical data-poisoning defenses exhibit the different regimes of effectiveness that we see
in theory?
• How is classification accuracy affected by the presence of data-poisoning defenses?
• How effective are our proposed data-driven attacks against the L2-distance-to-centroid and
the Slab defense?
These questions are considered in the context of three defenses – L2-norm, L2-distance-to-centroid
and Slab. The labeling oracle defense is not included because we lack appropriate labeling functions
for the real-world tasks involved in the experiment.
5.1 Experimental Methodology
Baseline Attacks. To evaluate the effectiveness of the defenses, we consider four canonical baseline
attacks. All attacks we use append the poisoning examples to the end of the clean data stream,
as [32] shows that this works best for our setting.
The Straight attack uses the SimplisticAttack algorithm with one minor difference – when the
generated (xt, yt) lies outside the feasible set F , it is projected back onto F . The Greedy attack,
motivated by [16], finds, at step t, the example (xt, yt) ∈ F that minimizes ‖θt+1 − θ∗‖, where θt+1
is derived from the Online Gradient Descent update rule; this example is then added to the end of
8
the stream. The Semi-Online attack [32] finds K poisoning examples together by maximizing the
loss of the resulting model on a clean validation dataset. The optimization problem is solved using
gradient descent. The poisoning points are again inserted at the end.
As a sanity-check, we also include an offline baseline – the Concentrated attack [12], which
performs well against many offline defenses. The original attack generates a poisoning set instead
of a sequence. To convert the poisoning set to a sequence, we need to impose an ordering on the
points. We consider three orders – positive first, negative first and random – and report the best
results of the three. This poisoning sequence is again added to the end of the stream.
Finally, we also implement our data-driven attacks in Section 4 to inject poisoning examples to the
initialization set. We try four different levels of contamination, with the ratio of poisoning to clean
examples in [0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2].
Data Sets. We consider four real-world data sets – UCI Breast Cancer (dimension d = 9), IMDB
Reviews[18] (d = 100),2 MNIST 1v7 (d = 784) and fashionMNIST[33] Bag v.s. Sandal (d = 784).
The standard OGD algorithm is able to learn models with high accuracy on all clean data sets.
Each data set in the experiment is split into four parts: initialization (used for the data-driven
defenses), training, validation (used by attacks) and test sets. Procedural details are presented
in Appendix B. The number of poisoning examples K is set to 80 for Breast Cancer, 100 for
MNIST/fashionMNIST and 200 for IMDB Review, which equals to 25%, 1.25% and 2% of the size
of the clean data stream.
Experimental Procedure. The learner works as follows. The OGD algorithm starts with θ0 = 0
and obtains a model θ by iterating over the sequence of examples output by the poisoner. Examples
that fall outside the feasible set corresponding to the learner’s defense are filtered out, and scores
for the data-driven defenses are calculated based on the initialization set. The effect of poisoning is
evaluated by the 0-1 classification accuracy of θ on the test set.
For Straight, Greedy and Concentrated attacks,the target model θ∗ is the negation of the offline
optimal model on the validation set scaled to unit L2 norm. For L2-norm defense, the defense
parameter τ is the maximum L2 norm of the input; for L2-distance-to-centroid, τ is the maximum
L2 distance between an input to its class centroid, and for Slab, it is the maximum Slab score.
5.2 Results and Discussion
Results. We present three categories of results. First, to directly measure the speed of attacks,
Figure 2 presents the test accuracy of the output model against the defense parameter τ when only
poisoned examples are filtered by the defense. Second, to determine the effect of defenses on accuracy
in practice, Figure 3 presents the test accuracy of θ against τ where both clean and the poisoned
examples are filtered. Finally, to evaluate our proposed data-driven attacks, the test accuracy of θ
against τ under the Straight attack is plotted in Figure 4 for different levels of contamination of the
initialization set. Here, the defense filters out both clean and poisoned examples as in practice.
2The features are extracted using Doc2Vec on the unlabeled reviews by setting d = 100.
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Figure. 2: Test accuracy of the final model θ against defense parameter τ when only the poisoning
points are filtered. Top to bottom: L2-norm, L2-distance-to-centroid and Slab defense.
Figure. 3: Test accuracy of final model θ against defense parameter τ when both clean and poisoning
points are filtered. Top to bottom: L2-norm, L2-distance-to-centroid and Slab defense.
Figure. 4: Test accuracy of L2-distance-to-centroid and Slab defenses against Straight attack when
the initialization set is contaminated. The parameter α is the ratio of poisoning points to clean
points. Each line shows the result for some α. Top: L2-distance-to-centroid. Bottom: Slab.
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Overall Performance of Attacks. We see that Straight, Greedy and Semi-Online are effective
online attacks, while Concentrated is mostly ineffective as it ignores the online nature of the problem.
Straight and Greedy perform similarly. Semi-Online typically performs better than Straight, as
it has more flexibility in selecting the poisoning examples; however it is also more prone to local
minima.
Regimes of Effectiveness for Defenses. We find that the L2-norm defense is overall a weak
defense. For small τ (corresponding to small R), attacks are not very effective, while a slight increase
in τ results in rapid attacks. This is to be expected as the constant C in Theorem 3.1 depends
inversely on R, and the results overall confirm the theory. The L2-distance-to-centroid defense shows
three regimes of effectiveness, confirming our theory. The Slab defense also shows three regimes for
IMDB, but appears to be strong for the other datasets. This indicates that Slab may be a highly
effective defense in the online setting.
Classification Accuracy vs. Defense Strength. We find that overall classification accuracy
goes through three stages as we increase the defense parameter τ (or, equivalently, decrease defense
strength). When τ is small, accuracy is low as the defense also filters out most clean points. For
moderate τ , more clean and poisoning points are used to update θ, and the accuracy depends on
the relative ‘strength’ of the two sets. Finally, for large τ , the defense is weak enough to let in both
clean and poisoning examples, again leading to low accuracy. Thus moderate values of τ are largely
best for classification accuracy. The exception is the Slab defense, which appears to retain high
accuracy for most datasets with increasing τ .
Data-Driven Attacks. We find that the data-driven attacks are highly effective for L2-distance-to-
centroid defense. The test accuracy drops with increasing contamination, and at 20% contamination,
the defense completely breaks down on MNIST, fashionMNIST and IMDB Review. The Slab defense,
in contrast, is more robust even to data-driven attacks – the learner can still find a τ that gives
high accuracy on each data set in spite of initial contamination. This suggests that the Slab defense
may be a highly effective defense overall for online data poisoning.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, we perform a thorough theoretical and experimental study of defenses against data
poisoning in online learning. Our theoretical analysis shows that typical defenses are in three possible
regimes and establishes conditions under which they hold, and motivates novel data-driven attacks.
Our experiments validate our theoretical findings, show that classification accuracy is typically best
for defenses of moderate stength, and demonstrate that the Slab defense is often highly effective
in practice, even against data-driven attacks. There are many avenues for future investigation –
for example, to more complex models such as neural networks and to other settings such as the
fully-online setting of [32]. In particular, an important line of future work is to extend our analysis
to more complex and realistic learning settings, such as reinforcement learning, and provide attacks
and defenses with provable guarantees.
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A Proofs to Theorems and Lemmas
A.1 Proof to Theorem 3.1
Recall that γ0 = min
(
R
‖θ˜0−θ∗‖ , 1/η
)
. In round t, we pick γt = min(γ∗t , γ0), where γ∗t is the solution
to γ
1+exp(θ˜>t (θ∗−θ˜t)γ)
= 1η . Suppose we set yt = 1 and xt = γt(θ
∗ − θ˜t); this (x, y) lies in F from the
way we choose γt. Notice that θ˜>t θ∗ −
∥∥∥θ˜t∥∥∥2 ≤ λ2. If γt = γ∗t , then the poisoner can output θ∗ in
the next step. Otherwise if γt = γ0, the norm of θ˜t − θ∗ shrinks geometrically because
∥∥∥θ˜t+1 − θ∗∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥θ˜t − θ∗ − η γ0(θ
∗ − θ˜t)
1 + exp
(
θ˜>t (θ∗ − θ˜t)γ0
)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥(θ˜t − θ∗)
1− ηγ0
1 + exp
(
θ˜>t (θ∗ − θ˜t)γ0
)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥(θ˜t − θ∗)(1− ηγ01 + exp(λ2γ0)
)∥∥∥∥
=
(
1− ηγ0
1 + exp(λ2γ0)
)∥∥∥θ˜t − θ∗∥∥∥ .
(4)
The first inequality holds because θ˜>t θ∗ −
∥∥∥θ˜t∥∥∥2 ≤ λ2 and the monotonicity of exponential function.
The last equality holds because 1 − ηγ01+exp(λ2γ0) ≥ 1 −
ηγ0
1+exp(θ˜>t (θ∗−θ˜t)γ0)
≥ 0 by our construction.
The result follows from setting C = 1
− log
(
1− ηγ0
1+exp(λ2γ0)
) .
Notice that if we let λ = 1, the Taylor expansion of C at γ0 = 0 is approximately 2/(ηγ0). If we
treat R as a variable, then when R is small, γ0 = R/‖θ˜0 − θ∗‖, and therefore C is approximately
2‖θ˜0 − θ∗‖/(ηR), which is in the order of O(1/R).
A.2 Statement and Proof to Lemma A.1
Lemma A.1. A data poisoner DP η(θ0, S,K,F , θ∗, ) can output a model θ if and only if there
exists some data poisoner DP η(θ0, S,K,F ′, θ∗, ) that outputs θ.
We first show that if a data poisoner can output θ using a sequence S˜ = {(x0, y0), · · · , (xT−1, yT−1)}
with each point (xi, yi) ∈ F , then there must be a data poisoner that output θ using a sequence
S˜′ = {(x′0, y′0), · · · , (x′T−1, y′T−1)} with each point (x′i, y′i) ∈ F ′. Notice that for an OGD algorithm
running on logistic regression model, (x,+1) and (−x,−1) will lead to the same gradient updates
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on the model parameter. We construct S˜′ as follows. For each (xi, yi) ∈ S˜, if (xi, yi) ∈ F ′, then we
let (x′i, y′i) = (xi, yi); otherwise, we let (x′i, y′i) = (−xi,−y′i). Notice by the construction rule of F ′,
at least one of (xi, yi) and (−xi,−yi) exists in F ′. Hence, we have obtained a data poisoner on F ′
using a poisoning sequence of same length and outputing the same model as a poisoner on F .
The reverse direction is similar. We can use the same technique to show that whenever a poisoner
can output θ using a sequence of length T with points on F ′, there is a sequence using points on F
that achieves the same goal. Therefore, the statement is true.
A.3 Proof to Theorem 3.2
For the first part, we use the same poisoning sequence as in the proof of Theorem 3.1; what remains
to be shown is that all (xt, yt) in this sequence still lie in the feasible set F . To show this, we begin
with showing that for any t, θ˜t − θ∗ = c(θ˜0 − θ∗) for some scalar c ∈ [0, 1].
We prove this by induction. The base case is easy – t = 0, and c = 1. In the inductive case, observe
that:
θ˜t+1 − θ∗ = θ˜t − θ∗ − ηγt(θ˜t − θ
∗)
1 + exp(θ˜>t (θ˜t − θ∗)γt)
,
and that (1− ηγt/(1 + exp(θ˜>t (θ˜t− θ∗)γt))) ∈ [0, 1] by construction. Thus, the inductive case follows.
Now, observe that the proof of Theorem 3.1 still goes through, as y = 1 and x = γ(θ∗−θ˜t) = cγ(θ∗−θ˜0)
is still a feasible point to add to the teaching sequence.
For the second part, observe that if the data poisoner outputs θ∗, then θ∗ = θ0−η
∑
i `
′(θi−1, xi, yi)yixi
for some (xi, yi)’s. For the augmented feasible set F ′, yi = +1 always. For logistic regression, `′ > 0
always. Hence, there should exist some collection of xi’s, and some positive scalars αi such that:∑
i
αixi = θ
∗ − θ0.
However, Lemma A.2 shows that such collection is impossible by letting u = θ∗ − θ˜ and β = 1.
Therefore, no data poisoner can output θ∗.
Lemma A.2. Let G be a convex set, u be a vector and ru /∈ G for all r ≥ 0. Then there is no set
of points {x1, · · · , xn|xi ∈ G,∀i ∈ [n]} such that∑
i
αixi = βu
for any αi, β ∈ R+ and n ∈ Z+.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction. The base case n = 1 is true because G does not contain
any point in the direction of u. Suppose the statement is true for n = k. Assume there exists a set
S = {x1, x2, · · · , xk+1} such that ∑
i∈[k+1]
αixi = βu. (5)
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Let x′ = α1α1+α2x1 +
α2
α1+α2
x2. Since both x1 and x2 are in G by our assumption, x′ is also in G by
the definition of convex set. Multiplying both side of the equation above by 1α1+α2 , we obtain
1
α1 + α2
k+1∑
i=1
αixi =
α1
α1 + α2
x1 +
α2
α1 + α2
x2 +
1
α1 + α2
k+1∑
i=3
αixi
= x′ +
k+1∑
i=3
αi
α1 + α2
xi
=
β
α1 + α2
u,
(6)
The equation implies that a set S˜ = {x′}⋃S\{x1, x2} is a set of k points in G such that a positive
linear combination of them gives a vector in the direction of u. However, this contradicts our
inductive assumption when n = k. Therefore, there cannot be a set of k + 1 points from G that
satisfies Equation 5. The statement we want to prove is also true for n = k + 1.
A.4 Various Attack Rates in the Intermediate Regime
In Section 3, we conclude that the poisoning attack’s rate can vary from impossible to rapid in the
intermediate regime. We show three examples in which the attack is very rapid, slow and impossible.
The Rapid Case. SimplisticAttack is shown to be effective against L2-norm defense. Let S˜ =
{(x0,+1), · · · , (xT−1,+1)} be the poisoning sequence generated by SimplisticAttack against L2-norm
defense, which only uses points with +1 label. Let xmin denote the point with the smallest L2 norm
among x0, · · · , xT−1. A feasible set F = {(rxxmin ,+1)|r ≥ 1} contains all points in S˜ but not the
origin. An attacker can use S˜ as the poisoning sequence to approach its target as rapidly as against
L2-norm defense, even though the feasible set F does not contain the origin.
The Slow Case. Notice that the poisoning points in SimplisticAttack normally have diminishing
magnitudes towards the end. We now show that if the attacker is only allowed to use poisoning
points with constant magnitude, then the attack can be very slow.
Suppose the feasible set only contains a single point (x,+1) where x = r θ
∗−θ˜0
‖θ∗−θ˜0‖ . The attacker can
only choose (x,+1) as the poisoning point. The gradient update will be
θt+1 = θt +
ηx
1 + exp(θ>t x)
for all t.
We consider a 1-D example with θ˜0 = 0.5, θ∗ = 1, step size η = 1 and an L2-norm upperbound
r = 10. If the attacker can choose any point (x,+1) such that x ≤ r = 10, the attacker can reach its
objective with a single poisoning points by solving the following equation
1 = 0.5 +
x
1 + exp(0.5x)
,
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which gives x ≈ 1.629.
Now suppose the attacker is only allowed to choose (r,+1) as the poisoning point. Let ∆t denote
the difference between θt+1 and θt. We have
∆t =
x
1 + exp(θ>t x)
=
10
1 + exp(10θt)
≤ 10
1 + exp(5)
.
The inequality is because θt ∈ [0.5, 1] as it starts from θ˜0 = 0.5 and approaches θ∗ = 1. The
attacker then needs at least d 0.5(1+exp(5))10 e = 8 poisoning points to achieve its goal. Notice that the
exponential term grows much more rapidly then the denominator. If r = 20, the attacker will need
at least d 0.5(1+exp(10))20 e = 551 points! In short, the attacker needs exponentially many points w.r.t.
r in this case to achieve the same objective that can be done using a single point against L2-norm
defense.
This example also naturally extends to high dimensional inputs as long as the attacker only wants
to change one coordinate of the model parameter.
The Impossible Case. We consider the same θ˜0, θ∗ and η as in the slow case. Now the attacker
can only choose (2.5,+1) as the poisoning point, i.e. r = 2.5. After one update step, the model θ
becomes
θ = θ˜ +
ηx
1 + exp(θ˜>x)
= 0.5 +
2.5
1 + exp(1.25)
= 1.058.
Notice that the model parameter monotonically increases if the attacker adds more poisoning points
of (2.5,+1) into the stream. Therefore, this θ after one poisoning point is the closest the attacker
can ever get to the target θ∗ = 1. No data poisoner can output θ∗ exactly.
A.5 Proof to Lemma 3.3
For simplicity, we consider a feasible set F ′c = {(yx,+1)|(x, y) ∈ Fc}, which is the one-sided form of
Fc. As a consequence of Lemma A.1, defenses characterized by Fc and F ′c have the same behavior.
We define F ′c− = {(−x,+1)|(x,−1) ∈ Fc−}. Then F ′c = Fc+
⋃F ′c− . Also, let L(r,u) denote a line
segment connecting the origin and a point r u‖u‖ as in Theorem 3.2.
The Rapid Case. For the first part, we show that there exists an r > 0 such that L(r, θ∗ −
θ˜0) ⊆ Fc+
⋃F ′c− . Suppose ‖µ+‖ < τ . Let α denote the angle between µ+ and θ∗ − θ˜0, and let
x = l(θ∗ − θ˜0)/
∥∥∥θ∗ − θ˜0∥∥∥ be a point in the direction of θ∗ − θ˜0 with norm l. A point (x,+1) is in
Fc+ if and only if it satisfies the following inequality
‖x− µ+‖2 = l2 − 2l ‖µ+‖ cosα+ ‖µ+‖2 ≤ τ2.
We want to find the range for l when the inequality holds. Notice that the determinant of this
quadratic inequality, ‖µ+‖2 (cosα)2−‖µ+‖2+τ2, is always positive. Therefore, real solutions always
exist for the lower and upper bound of l. Solving the inequality gives us
‖µ+‖ cosα−
√
‖µ+‖2 (cosα)2 − ‖µ+‖2 + τ2 ≤ l ≤ ‖µ+‖ cosα+
√
‖µ+‖2 (cosα)2 − ‖µ+‖2 + τ2.
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It is also easy to verify that the lower bound is smaller than 0 and the upper bound is larger than 0.
Let r = ‖µ+‖ cosα+
√
‖µ+‖2 (cosα)2 − ‖µ+‖2 + τ2. The solution implies that L(r, θ∗ − θ˜0) ⊆ Fc+.
Similarly, when ‖µ−‖ < τ , we can show that there exists an r such that L(r, θ∗ − θ˜0) is in F ′c− .
Therefore, when τ > min(‖µ+‖ , ‖µ−‖), there exists some r > 0 s.t. L(r, θ∗ − θ˜0) ⊆ F ′c. The rest
follows from Theorem 3.2.
The Impossible Case. For the second part, we show that G = {(x,+1)|(θ∗ − θ0)>x ≤ 0}, i.e.
the negative halfspace characterized by (θ∗ − θ0), contains both Fc+ and F ′c− yet does not intersect
L(+∞, θ∗ − θ0) at all. The rest follows from Theorem 3.2.
We first look at Fc+. The condition 〈µ+, θ∗ − θ0〉 < 0 implies that µ+ ∈ G. The distance between
µ+ to the hyperplane (θ∗ − θ0)>x = 0 is ‖u+‖. Since ‖u+‖ ≥ τ , none of the point in Fc+ can cross
the hyperplane, and therefore Fc+ ⊆ G. The proof for showing F ′c− in G is analogous. Therefore G
contains both Fc+ and F ′c− . In addition, G does not contain any point x in L(+∞, θ∗ − θ0) because
x = r(θ∗−θ0)/‖θ∗−θ0‖ for some r > 0, and (θ∗−θ0)>x = (θ∗−θ0)>(r(θ∗−θ0)/‖θ∗−θ0‖) = r > 0.
A.6 Proof to Lemma 3.4
For simplicity, we consider a feasible set F ′s = {(yx,+1)|(x, y) ∈ Fs}, which is the one-sided form of
Fs. As a consequence of Lemma A.1, defenses characterized by Fs and F ′s have the same behavior.
We define F ′s− = {(−x,+1)|(x,−1) ∈ Fs−}. Then F ′s = Fs+
⋃F ′s− .
The Rapid Case. For the first part, we show that L((τ − b+)/ ‖β‖ , θ∗ − θ˜0) is in Fs+ or L((τ −
b−)/ ‖β‖ , θ∗ − θ˜0) is in F ′s− .
Suppose τ − b+ > 0 > −τ − b+. Let x be a point in L((τ − b+)/ ‖β‖ , θ∗ − θ˜0). Then x can be
expressed as x = r(θ∗ − θ˜)/
∥∥∥θ∗ − θ˜∥∥∥ for some 0 < r < (τ − b+)/ ‖β‖. We know that
β>x ≤ ‖β‖ r ≤ ‖β‖ (τ − b+)/ ‖β‖ = τ − b+,
therefore β>x+ b+ ≤ τ . On the other hand, β>x > 0 by our assumption that β>(θ∗ − θ˜0) > 0, and
b+ > −τ by the condition −τ − b+ < 0. Therefore, β>x+ b+ > b+ > −τ . We can conclude that
the Slab score |β>x| ≤ τ , and hence L((τ − b+)/ ‖β‖ , θ∗ − θ˜0) ∈ Fs+.
Similarly, we can show that L((τ − b−)/ ‖β‖ , θ∗ − θ˜0) is in F ′s− when τ − b− > 0 > −τ −
b−. The rest follows from Theorem 3.2, and an example of such a rapid data poisoner is
SimplisticAttack(θ0, S,K,F , θ∗, , r) in which F = F ′s and r = min((τ − b+)/ ‖β‖ , (τ − b−)/ ‖β‖).
The Impossible Case. For the second part, we show that G = {(x,+1)|β>x ≤ 0}, i.e. the negative
halfspace characterized by β, contains both Fs+ and F ′s− yet does not intersect L(+∞, θ∗ − θ˜0) at
all. The rest follows from Theorem 3.2.
We first look at Fs+ when 0 > τ − b+ > −τ − b+. We know that the Slab score |β>x+ b+| ≤ τ for all
x ∈ Fs+. Combining with the condition that τ − b+ < 0, we have β>x ≤ τ − b+ < 0 for all x ∈ Fs+.
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Therefore, Fs+ ⊆ G. The proof for showing F ′s− in G is analogous. Also, since β>(θ∗ − θ˜0) > 0, we
have β>x > 0 for all x ∈ L(+∞, θ∗ − θ˜0). Therefore, G does not intersect L(+∞, θ∗ − θ˜0) at all.
Theorem 3.2 tells that no data poisoner can output θ∗ starting from θ˜0.
If β>(θ∗ − θ0) > 0, then we can replace θ˜0 in the above analysis with θ0, and show that G does not
intersect L(+∞, θ∗ − θ0) at all. Theorem 3.2 then tells that no data poisoner can output θ∗.
21
B Experiment Details
B.1 Data Preparation
UCI Breast Cancer. Initialization, training, validation and test data sets have size 400, 100, 50, 100
respectively. The data set is divided in random. Since the data set is small in size, we split the data
set in ten different ways, run experiments on all ten data sets and report the average test accuracy.
IMDB Review We train a Doc2Vec feature extractor on the 50000 unlabeled reviews provided in
the original data set using the method in [28]. Then we convert reviews in the original training and
test set into feature vector of d = 100 using the extractor. Initialization, training, validation and
test data sets have size 10000, 5000, 2000, 5000 respectively. The first three data sets are drawn from
the original training set in vector representation without replacement. The test set is drawn from
the original test set.
MNIST 1v7. We use a subset of the MNIST handwritten digit data set containing images of
Digit 1 and 7. Initialization, training, validation and test data set have size 8000, 1000, 500, 1000
respectively. The first three data sets are drawn from the original MNIST training sets in random
with no replacement. The test set is drawn from the original MNIST test set.
fashionMNIST Bag v.s. Sandal. We use a subset of the fashionMNIST data set contain-
ing images of bags and sandal. Initialization, training, validation and test data set have size
8000, 1000, 500, 1000 respectively. The first three data sets are drawn from the original fashion-
MNIST training sets in random with no replacement. The test set is drawn from the original
fashionMNIST test set.
Each data set is normalized by subtracting the mean of all data points and then scaled into [−1, 1]d.
B.2 Detailed Experiment Parameters.
The learning rate η is set to 0.05 for UCI Breast Cancer and 0.01 for the other three data sets. The
model obtained after making one pass of the training set using OGD algorithm has high accuracy
on all data sets.
For Concentrated attack, the attacker needs to divide its attack budget, i.e. number of poisoning
points, to points with +1 and −1 labels. We try three different splits – all +1 points, half-half, all
−1 points – and report the best in terms of poisoning effect.
As mentioned in Section 5, Concentrated attack also needs to impose an order to points in the
poisoning set. In positive first order, the attacker appends all the points with +1 label to the data
stream before appending points with −1 labels. In negative first order, the attacker appends all the
points with −1 label to the data stream first instead. In random order, the points are shuffled and
appended to the data stream. We try 100 different random orders, and report the best among the
positive-first, negative-first and random orders in terms of poisoning effect.
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For poisoning the initialization set used by slab defense, the attacker also needs to divide its attack
budget to points with +1 and −1 labels. We divide the budget proportional to the fraction of +1
and −1 points in the clean initialization set.
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